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The Relevance of the Concepts of War
and Armed Conflict to the Law of

Neutrality
Georgios C. Petrochilos*
ABSTRACT

The law of neutrality applies among states engaged in
war and third states seeking to maintain friendly relations
with the belligerent states. While belligerent partiespossess
belligerent rights, including those in the Law of Prize, states
deemed neutral must fulfill certain neutral duties.
In
exchange, neutral states enjoy the protection afforded to
neutralparties by the law of neutrality.
The Article focuses on the state of affairs that triggers
application of the law of neutrality. The law addressingthis
issue leaves many questions unanswered. This Article
addresses the importance of the declaration of war by
belligerent states in assessing whether the law of neutrality
will apply to third states. The Article argues that state
practice has established that the laws of war and neutrality
are now conditioned on the existence of armed conflict, rather
than official declarations of war. The Article concludes by
adopting the concept of a "stateof generalized hostilities" to
accurately characterize state practice regarding the Laws of
War and the status of third states as neutrals.

* LL.B. (Athens), Dipl6m6 (Strasbourg), M.Juris (Oxon), D.Phil. Cand. in the
University of Oxford, Advocate of the Hellenic Bar. The Author would like to
express his gratitude to Professor Ian Brownhje, CBE, QC, FBA, for his
constructive criticism and advice throughout the writing of the paper in which
this Article originates. The Author remains responsible for any omissions or
errors.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The law of neutrality is the regime regulating the relations
between two or more states waging a war and the states wishing
to retain friendly relations with the war-waging parties.
It
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therefore comprises the rules pertaining to the duties and rights
of neutrals, and the powers the belligerents possess vis-A-vis
neutrals in order to verify whether the latter comply with their
neutral duties. These belligerent powers are mainly governed by
the Law of Prize. 1
The above definition begs the question "what is war?" In
common parlance, the term signifies an armed contention of some
sort. In law, however, a state of war is a technical concept
designating a particular state of affairs, the existence of which is
apposite to the application of a special body of rules, the Laws of
War. 2 This formula, however, does not spell out precisely what
conditions comprise a state of war; this question remains open in
the law as it stands. According to the classical state of war
doctrine, a state of war exists if at least one of the parties to a
conflict admits or declares it to exist. The determination of third
states, or indeed, the other party to a conflict is largely
irrelevant. 3 The insufficiency of this unilateral and formalistic
conception became clear in the practical application of the socalled ius contra bello. The prescription not to "resort to war"
contained in the Kellogg-Briand Pact 4 and the Covenant of the
League of Nations s may be, and has been, circumvented by a
state actually initiating or partaking in hostilities while asserting
that it did not intend to create a state of war. 6 Despite these
circumventions, the classical state of war doctrine persisted in the
7
League of Nations' practice.
Post-1945 developments in the law took account of these
complexities and artificialities, which were a source of potential
evasion of the law. The U.N. Charter reaffirmed the prohibition of
war, already part of customary law,8 and restated it in an attempt
to lift the ambiguities. Article 2(4) reads: "All Members will
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of

1.
See 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 604-44 (1968)
(discussing the Law of Prize in naval warfare).
2.
Id.
3.
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 398
(1963).
4.
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S.
57; Cmd. 3410.
5.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 11, 16.
6.
See infranote 202 and accompanying text.
7.
See, e.g., Reports and Resolutions on the Subject of Article 16 of the
League of Nations Covenant, League of Nations Doc. A. 14.1927.V. (1927).
8.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 109-112; 2 FRIEDRICH BERBER,
LEHRBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS: KRIEGSRECHT 35 (1969); see also XXII TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 462-64 (1948); Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4,
187-92
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
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force.... ."9 The use of the phrase "state of war" as a term of art
has also been abolished in the rules of warfare. The 1949 Geneva

Conventions apply, according to a common Article 2, "to all cases
of declared wars or any other armed conflict... even if the state
of war is not recognised by one of [the parties]." 10 Generally, it
may be said that in the practice of states the legal principle
relevant to the application of the whole corpus of the Law of
Warfare (ius in bello) has become armed conflict."
The Laws of War have thus ceased to be entirely conditioned
on the existence of a state of war. Despite the changes in the
general legal framework, however, old problems persist and have
become accentuated with regard to neutrality. Is the existence of
a state of war, if such a state may still exist in law, a legal
requirement of neutrality-or has it been replaced by the concept
of armed conflict? Furthermore, what are the repercussions of
outlawing the use of force on the war-dependent institution of
neutrality? This Article proposes to address these persistent
issues in the following fashion. First, the Article will examine
them in the context of the written law. Second, it will briefly spell
out the cases in which neutrality is still a lawful position as a
necessary precursor to any analysis of state practice. Third, it
will analyze critically the pertinent examples in state practice,
relying predominately on primary sources. Finally, the Article will
systematize the findings in state practice.

II. SOME SOURCES OF DOUBT WITH REGARD TO
NEUTRALITY IN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. The Lacuna in Written Law
The consolidation of the customary rules of neutrality led to
the codification of the law in the two Peace Conferences, in 1899
and 1907.
The two 1907 Hague Conventions, namely
"Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land,"' 2 and "Convention
(XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in

9.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
10.
See, e.g., Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Cmd 550.
11.
See the unequivocal Japanese official position to that effect in
THE PRACTICE OF JAPAN ININTERNATIONAL LAw: 1961-1970, para. 292 (Shigeru Oda

& Hisashi Owada eds., 1982).
12.
Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague Convention V), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2310.
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Naval War"13 are significant in that they spell out detailed rules
on neutral rights and duties, 14 and therefore provide a starting
point for analysis.
Both Conventions are silent on the main issue of this Article:
the legal notions relevant to the application of the law of
neutrality. Although the Conventions set forth rules that apply
during "war," and as a result often refer to "war," the meaning of
the term is not defined for the purpose of the Conventions. The
texts adopted in the context of the Peace Conference as a whole,
however, may provide some guidance. Convention III "Relative to
the Opening of Hostilities" was adopted in the course of the same
Peace Conference, and it stipulates that hostilities may not begin
prior to an ultimatum or a declaration of war.15 Furthermore,
Article 2 of Convention III contains a specific rule addressing the
critical time that a state of war, within the meaning of the said
Convention, becomes effective for neutral powers.16 It is against
this background of regulated war that the Neutrality Conventions

were conceived, which explains the fact that writers of that period
never referred to any confusion on this point. 17

Nonetheless, this does not settle the matter. Convention III
purports to set forth the conditions for legitimate warfare, not the
requirements for the application of neutrality.
Neither the
wording of Article 2 nor the spirit and economy of that Convention
indicate that the law of neutrality is to apply only after a
declaration of war.1 8 That is, the drafters of, and the parties to,
the above Conventions did not intend to state that the law of
neutrality may not apply in wars brought about by means other
than a declaration of war or an ultimatum-although these were
conceived as the lawful ways to initiate war.
Another point with respect to the neutrality Conventions is
that they were conceived then as an ab initio codification of
existing customary law. 19 This signifies that the customary

13.
Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War (Hague Convention XIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.
14.
The 1928 Havana Convention on maritime neutrality reproduces
substantially or verbatim the provisions of Hague Convention XIII. See
Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 135 L.N.T.S. 187.
15.
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities (Hague Convention
III), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259; see also Michel Voelkel, Faut-il encore declarer
la guerre?, 1991 ANNUAIRE FRANCA1S DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [A.F.D.I.] 7.
16.
SeeThe Wirpi, 12 I.L.R. 300 (Prize Ct., Hamburg, 1941).
17.
See, e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 569570 (J.B. Atlay ed., 6th ed. 1909).
18.
Cf. Louis Renault, Rapport sur l'Ouverture des Hostilitds, in 3 AcTEs ET
DOCUMENTS DE LA DEUXItME CONF2RENCE DE LA PAIX 46, 49-50 (1907).
19.
See The Regolo Attilio and other vessels (It., U.K., U.S. v. Sp.), 12
R.I.A.A. 3, 8 (ad hoc 1945); see also 6 RSPERTOIRE DE LA PRATIQUE FRANQAISE EN
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international law of neutrality continues to exist and evolve for
the process of codification is without prejudice to the existence
and content of a customary norm. 20 It is to such developments in
the law of neutrality as regards its conditions of application that
this Article will turn. First, however, there are two further
preliminary points that need to be made in order to delimit the
domain of this Article.
B. CommercialRelations between Individuals
and Belligerent States
A perusal of the Hague Neutrality Conventions indicates that
the duties of neutrals constitute specific manifestations of two
main principles: the principle of abstention from the conflict, and
the principle of impartiality in the application of measures taken
in matters of war. Both Conventions contain a common Article 7,
however, which limits the duty of abstention incumbent on a
neutral state by stipulating that a neutral power is not bound to
prevent the export of arms supplies for the use of either
belligerent.2 1 It is not within the ambit of this Article to explain
the logic behind this provision, but the doubts expressed by
22
learned writers about the expediency of preserving this rule
have been affirmed by contemporary state practice: an essential
is the
manifestation of the observance of neutral duties
23
belligerents.
the
to
supplies
military
of
discontinuance
4
C. Neutrality under the U.N. Charter2

The premises of neutrality are in sharp conflict with the idea
behind the creation of the U.N. Whereas neutrality guarantees
peace to states individually through a stance of abstention, in the
U.N. system peace is restored by collective action under the
guidance of the Security Council. In the more traditional legal
fashion of vires, neutrality logically presupposes independencethat is, the legal capacity to determine a state's own position with
United Nations
regard to questions of peace and war.

1014 (Alexandre-Charles Kiss ed., 1969)
(collection of official documents).
177-82.
See Nicaragua,supranote 8,
20.
See supranotes 12 & 13 (citing Hague Conventions V and XIII).
21.
See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY INPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
22.

MATISRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

LAW 301 (Corbett trans., 1957); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 346-347 (1964).

See infra Parts III.A. 1, III.B & III.C. 1.
23.
See John B. Whitton, La Neutralitd et la Socidtd des Nations, 17
24.
R.C.A.D.I. 449 (1927-I1) (discussing neutrality under the League of Nations
Covenant); NICOLAS POLITIs, LA NEUTRALIT8 ET LA PAIx (1934) (Macken trans., 1935).

1998]

RELEVANCE OF WAR AND ARMED CONFLICT TO NEUTRALITY

581

membership restricts a state's ability to make these decisions
independently. This is made clear in Article 2(5) of the U.N.
Charter, which provides for a duty of cooperation with the
25
organisation.
This contradiction of principle, however, does not lead to a
tacit abrogation or abolition of neutrality as an institution. 2 6 In
the absence of any express reference to neutrality in the U.N.
28
Charter, 2 7 any possible conflicts must be resolved with caution.
Although the issue merits separate analysis, it is sufficient for the
purposes of this Article to state that neutrality is permissible in
any case where there is no binding Security Council decision
prescribing a certain course of conduct in the form of collective
action. Neutrality must therefore not be excluded in case the

Security Council does not designate an aggressor party, or does
so but fails to prescribe collective action. 2 9 In this latter case, the
nuance is that the conclusive determination of an aggressor by
the Security Council3 0 precludes the adoption of a neutral
position to the extent that doing so involves the granting of rights
3
or facilities to the aggressor party. '
It is only when the Security Council adopts a binding
Resolution under Chapter VII, in which collective action is
prescribed, that all member states are bound by Articles 2(5) and
25 to participate in such action, and not to take any measures to
fetter its exercise. 32 The enforcement action against Iraq, after its
invasion of Kuwait, is a particularly interesting case study of
collective action in relation to neutrality. Having issued economic
sanctions, 3 3 with which the states have almost universally

25.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5.

26.

Initially, some commentators believed that it did. See, e.g., C.G. Dehn,

The Problem of Neutrality, 31 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY [T.G.S] 139
(1946); N.P. Grieve, The PresentPosition of "NeutralStates', 33 T.G.S. 99 (1948);
ISIDRO FABELA, LA NEUTRALIT8 145-161 (1949).
27.
A French proposal to amend Article 2(5) to explicitly exclude the
invocation of the status of permanent neutral as a valid reason for
nonparticipation in collective action was not accepted. See J.A. Frowein, Article 2,
in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 129, 1 (Brunno Simma et
al. eds., 1994).
28.
Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operationof the Laws of War,
30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 206, 209 (1953).
29.
This was the case during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. See S.C.
Res. 360, U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., 1789th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/360 (1974).
30.
For the conclusiveness of such determination, see Delbrfick, Article 25,
in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 27, at 407-

418.
31.
See, e.g., Hague Convention XIII, supranote 13, arts. 17,19 (regulating
the admission of vessels in ports).
32.
33.

See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 25.
See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932 mtg., U.N. Doc.

S/Res/660 (1990).
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complied,3 4 the Security Council authorized, but did not require,
collective action in support of Kuwait in Resolution 678.35 Again,
the question of the precise legal nature of the action actually
undertaken merits separate examination. 3 6 Suffice it to observe
that, as in the Korean War, action was not taken under Article 42,

but on the initiative of member states under the authorization of
the Security Council.3 7 In both cases, member states acted
lawfully, that is, with the consent of the Security Council, but
they were not obliged to act in that manner.
A number of states officially declared that they would remain
neutral, and observe the duties of neutrals. Switzerland did not
allow the overflight of allied aircraft in its airspace,3 8 nor did
Jordan or India. 39 Furthermore, Iran stated that any aircraft that

entered its airspace would be withheld "until the termination of
hostilities. "4 ° These statements were in perfect accord with the
law of neutrality as codified in the Hague Conventions. 41 More
importantly, perhaps, there is no evidence that this stance was
not considered by the Allied Chief of Staff to be illegal. This would
be a position in accord with the traditional law of neutrality.
Thus far, it has been established that neutrality exists under
the U.N. Charter, and it subsists even in the presence of collective

For a repertory of national and supra-national implementing
34.
legislation, see, for example, European Economic Community Council Regulations
2340/90, 1990 O.J. (L213) 1; 3155/90, 1990 O.J. (L304) 1; 29 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
476-477 (1991) (Can.); 24 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.B.D.I.] 216-218
(1991) (BeIg.) The U.S. documents are collected in THE KUWAIT/IRAQ SANCTIONS:
UNITED STATES REGULATIONS INAN INTERNATIONAL SETTING (Preston Brown ed., 1991).
35.
See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (1991).
The U.K.'s position was that it constituted action in collective self36.
defense. Under the Authority of the Security Council Resolution 678; see
Statement of Prime Minister Major, 183 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 979-80 (1991).
See also CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 313
37.
(1993); Statement, 25 NErH. Y. B. INT'L L. 442-45 (1994). For an analysis of
neutrality in the Korean War, see Howard J. Taubenfeld, InternationalActions and
Neutrality, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1953).
1
38.
See the relevant official documents and Statements in
SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPkISCHES RECHT
The situation with Switzerland is particularly
[S.Z.I.E.R.] 578-579 (1991).
complex, owing to the fact that it is not a member of the United Nations, and is
See also Dietrich Schindler,
guaranteed the status of permanent neutral.
Kollektive Sicherheit der Vereinten Nationen und daurende Neutralitdt der Schweiz,
2 S.Z.I.E.R. 435 (1992); Daniel Thfirer, Comment, U.N. Enforcement Measures and
Neutrality; the Case of Switzerland, 30 ARcHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS [A.V.R.] 63
(1992).
See Department of Defense Report, Appendix, 31 I.L.M. 612, 637-640
39.
(1992); U.N. Doc. S/22099 (Jan. 17, 1991).
See U.N. Docs. S/22141 (Jan. 23, 1991), S/22163 (Jan. 28, 1991).
40.
Articles 3, 8, 21, and 25 of Hague Convention XIII, supra note 13,
41.
consecrate the inviolability of neutral territory, which also extends to the airspace
above. See also supranote 38.
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action authorized, but not prescribed, by the Security Council.
Neutrality has applied in such cases regardless of the fact that
enforcement action pursuant to the U.N. Charter is not
considered to result in a state of belligerency. 42 This last finding,
however, is only tentative at this point, and one must turn to
contemporary state practice for further guidance.

III. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES FROM THE RELEVANT
STATE PRACTICE

In all the examples discussed below, the application of the
law of neutrality was an essential aspect of the legal situation
ensuing from the conflict. For the purposes of this Article, state
practice comprised official statements, conduct, claims, and
legislative acts.43 Judicial decisions are also considered to the
extent that they reflect the official position of the forum.
Emphasis has been given to material that reflects a legal position,
especially of the states particularly affected by the conflicts
discussed.4
A. The Arab-IsraeliConflict
The Arab-Israeli conflict spanned approximately thirty years,
comprising periods of full-scale hostilities followed by lengthy
intervals of political tension and isolated hostile incidents (lowintensity conflict). There are four periods of distinct persistent
armed conflict, namely 1948-1949, 1955-1956, 1967, and 1973.
Throughout the whole period of the conflict, neutrality was a
recurring theme. There are two broad issues to be identified and
distinguished for the purposes of analysis:
(1) the position
nonparticipant states adopted with regard to the war-waging
parties, and (2) the assertion of belligerent rights by Egypt toward
third states.
1. The Supply of Military Materiel to the Parties
It is significant to note at the outset that third party states
generally avoided taking a precise legal position regarding the
nature of the conflict, and classifying their position accordingly.

42.
See, e.g., Barry Mawhinney, CanadianPractice in InternationalLaw, At
the Departmentof ExternalAffairs 1990, 29 CAN. Y.B. INTL L. 454, 467 (1991).
43.
Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT.
Y.B. INT' L. 1 (1974-1975).
44.
Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 4,43-44 (Feb. 20).
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For instance, Canada adopted a consistent policy of imposing
restrictions on arms supplies during the periods of actual
hostilities.
These restrictions were part of Canada's general
foreign policy and were not based on express grounds of
neutrality. 45 The U.K.'s official position was that because armed
hostilities had been acknowledged, arms supplies would not be
discontinued. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, stated in 1956 that "over the pastfive
years [the United Kingdom has] managed to keep a fair balance"
in arms supplies. 4 6 France was the major arms supplier to Israel
in the 1950s, 4 7 and a number of East European countries
supplied arms, mainly to the Arab belligerents, throughout the
years of conflict. 48 By way of contrast, the official position of the
Federal Republic of Germany is interesting. The Arab League
protested
an
agreement
entitling Israel
to
pecuniary
compensation for World War Two, stating that the 1948 war was
still in progress. Bundeskanzler Adenauer conceded that the
Federal Republic was subject to the duties of neutrals, and stated
that the terms of the agreement precluded Israel from using the
funds towards the procurement of military supplies. 4 9 It was
thus a significant policy change when France5 0 and the United
Kingdom.5 decided to observe strict neutrality during the period
of actual hostilities in the later stages of the conflict in 1967 and
1973. The United States, not having supplied arms until 1966,
adopted a formal position of neutrality in the course of the 1967
53
war,5 2 but did not maintain that position in the 1973 war.

45.
See STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ARMS
TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD 287 (1971) [hereinafter SIPRI].

46.

Middle East, 550 PARL. DEB., H.C. 2146 (Mar. 28 1956) (emphasis

added). Compare the Swiss practice in early World War Two as reflected in the
documents collected in 4 REPERTOIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 225253 (Paul Guggenheim et al. eds., 1975).

47.

See SIPRI, supranote 45, at 530-3 1.

48.

MICHAEL CARVER, WAR SINCE 1945, 240 (1980).

49.

See V61kerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den

Jahren1949 bis 1955, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND

VOLKERRECHT [ZAORV] 175, 283-84 (1963), confirming an earlier statement
reprinted in V61kerrechtliche Praxis der BRD im Jahren 1956, 18 ZAORV 691, 724
(1957).

50.

See the documents collected by Jean Charpentier, Pratique Frangaise

concernant le Droit InternationalPublic, [1967] A.F.D.I. 892; [1968] A.F.D.I. 892896; [1969] A.F.D.I. 893-894.
51.
See SIPRI, supranote 45, at 515, 524.
52.
See The Situation in the NearEast, 56 DEPlt ST. BULL., June 26, 1967,
at 949.
53.
Patrick M. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of
the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, 301 (1976).
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The application of the law of neutrality may justifiably be
described as unsatisfactory due to its inconsistencies. Be that as
it may, this Article is concerned with a more formal aspect of the
law of neutrality. Despite the inconsistency the evidence presents
from a substantive point of view, a certain useful pattern of
conduct is apparent so far, to the effect that neutrality is a
permissible policy toward parties involved in actual hostilities.
One argument against this assertion is based on the fact that a
Tripartite Declaration by France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom 5 4 limiting arms supplies to the Middle East was
made in 1950, when actual hostilities were not in progress. There
is nothing in that agreement, however, to suggest it was prompted
by a sense of legal duty, that is, a duty imposed by neutrality,
rather than the mere political preference that hostilities not occur
again.
This proposition must now be tested in contradistinction with
state practice in respect to the invocation of a state of belligerency
by Egypt, as the purported source of "active legitimation" for
belligerent measures taken by her against vessels flying the flag of
a third party state.
2. Prize Action in the Suez Canal
Although the existence of a state of war was an essential
argument advanced by the Egyptian government to justify the
exercise of visit, search, and seizure on vessels flying the flag of
third party states (and their cargoes), the legality of these
measures was not dependent solely on rules of neutrality. The
Suez Canal is subject to a special regime consecrated by the 1888
Constantinople Convention,5 5 which binds Egypt as successor to
the Ottoman Empire.5 6 The Constantinople Convention provides
very limited exceptions when freedom of navigation in the Suez
57
Canal may be limited "in time[s] of peace as in time[s] of war,"
and imposes additional conditions for interfering with that
freedom, beyond those imposed by the law of neutrality.5 8

54.

See TripartiteDeclarationRegarding Security in the Near East, 22 DEPT

ST. BULL. 886 (May 25, 1950).
55.
Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal, Oct. 29,
1888, 171 Consol. T.S. 241.
56.
Declaration made by the Government of Egypt on the Suez Canal and
the Arrangements for its Operation, Apr. 24, 1957, arts. 1, 3(a), 265 U.N.T.S. 300.
57.
See Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal,
supranote 55, arts. I, X.
58.
See also Ruth Lapidoth, The Suez Cana the Gulf of Suez, and the 1979
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF
BINDSCHEDLER 617 (Emmanuel Diez et al. eds., 1980); RICHARD R. BAXTER,
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 216 (1964); YVES VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE,
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Egypt declared war on Israel on May 14, 1948. 5 9 On the
same day, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to all Israeli ships, issued
lists of contraband, and instituted a Prize Court in Alexandria.6 0
Pursuant to this legislation, the Egyptian authorities exercised

the well-established right 61 of visit, search, and seizure on all
vessels flying the flag of third-party states that were en route to or
coming from Israel, except Arab states. Egypt relied on the
proclaimed state of war to justify these measures as lawful action
to be tolerated by neutrals as a matter of neutral duty. 6 2 Indeed,
this justification is consonant with a strong view in continental
European doctrine, according to which a declaration of war is a
demonstration of the will to bring into force the Laws of War,
which declaration therefore obligates third states to submit to
63
belligerent rights.
As a preliminary matter, it should be observed that the
Egyptian practice reflects the position that all third states were to
be considered neutral, although at that stage no declarations of
neutrality had been made. It is also significant that it was argued
before the Prize Court on several occasions that these measures
were not valid as belligerent action since Egypt did not recognize
Israel to be a state, and war-in the technical sense-can only
occur between states. 64 By implication, the Prize Court agreed
that the sedes materiae of the validity of measures was the
existence of a state of war when it held that: "The existence of a
state of war or of neutrality in so far as non-belligerents are
concerned cannot be discussed by the Court, for it is [its] duty to

LES GARANTIES DE NAVIGATION DANS LE CANAL DE SUEZ 76 (1960); Leo Gross, Passage
through the Suez Canal of Israel-bound Cargo and Israel Ships, 51 AM. J. INT'L L.
530 (1957); HEINZ WAGNER, DER ARABISCH-ISRAELISCHE KONFLIKT IM VOLKERRECHT

380 (1971).

59.
Syria also declared war in 1948. Kuwait, Sudan, Algeria and Iraq
declared war in 1967.
60.

See Ahmed Safwat Bey, The Egyptian Prize Court: Organization and

Procedure,5 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.E.D.I.] 28 (1949).
61.
See The Carthage (Fr. v. It.), 11 R.I.A.A. 449; (Perm. Ct Arb. 1913),

translatedin Carthage,7 AM. J. INT' L. 623, 626 (1913).
62.

See supranote 58.

63.
See Dietrich Schindler, 1907 Hague Convention XII Concerning The
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare, in THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 21112 (Natalino Ronzitti ed. 1988); Rudolf L. Bindschedler, Frieden, Krieg und

Neutralitdt im V61kerrecht der Gegenwart, in 1 MULTITUDO LEGUM IUS UNUM 27, 3738 (1973); Paul Guggenheim, La Sdcuritd collective et le Problfme de la Neutralit6,
2 S.J.I.R. 9 (1945); LOTHAR KOTZSH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (XVII ITUDES D'HISTOIRE ]tCONOMIQUE, POLITIQUE ET SOCIALE)
passim (1956); infra note 142.

64.

See, e.g.,

OPPENHEIM'S

(H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

A

TREATISE
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apply the law without examining its legality."65 Another, arguably
less cogent, argument employed by the Prize Court to reject such
objections was modeled on the principle of estoppel. In the case
of The Flying Trader, the Prize Court observed that an objection
based on nonrecognition of Israel by Egypt could not be made by
subjects of a state that did recognize Israel as a state. 6 6 In
international law, however, the fact of nonrecognition should not
by itself constitute a compelling reason for the nonattribution of
belligerent status. 67
Israeli courts did not encounter such
68
difficulties in ascertaining the legal situation.
This Author shares the view that the legality of prize action in

time of actual armed hostilities is not open to valid objection. 69
Even during the 1948-49 period of actual conflict, however,
numerous governments protested the measures. 70 It must not be
overlooked nonetheless that the protests did not clarify whether
their contention was based upon an alleged violation of the
Constantinople Convention or the insufficiency of the alleged
state of war tout court.
The debate on the legality of Egypt's belligerent measures
against neutral vessels becomes more interesting after the
conclusion of the Armistice Agreement in 1949.71
Egypt
maintained prize legislation in force 72 and took action thereupon
arguing that an armistice only suspends hostilities, and does not

65.
66.
(Egypt).

The Fjeld, 7 I.L.R. 345, 347 (Prize Ct. of Alexandria, Egypt 1950).
The Flying Trader, 17 I.L.R. 440, 444-45 (Prize Ct. of Alexandria 1956)

67.
For instance, the United States was described as being "at war" with
the tribal Nation of the Cayuga Indians in a Treaty of Peace signed with the
United Kingdom as Protecting Power of the said Nation, despite the fact that the
Cayuga Indians were not a state in international law. See Treaty of Peace
between Great Britain and the United States, Dec. 24, 1814, G.B.-U.S., art. IX, 63
Consol. T.S. 421,429; Cayuga Indians (G.B. v. U.S.) 6 R.I.A.A. 173, 176 (1926).
68.
See Diab v. Attorney General., 19 I.L.R. 550, 553 (Isr. S.Ct., sitting as
Cr.A. 1952); see also Yudsin v. Estate of Shanti, (T.A. 1952), discussed in Diab,
19 I.L.R. at 555.
69.
See, e.g. BAXTER, supranote 58, at 223-24.
70.
See Complaint by Israel of Egyptian Restrictions on the Passage of
Ships through the Suez Canal, 1951 U.N.Y.B. 298 (statement of Egyptian
representative acknowledging presence of state protests during period of conflict)

[hereinafter Egyptian Statement].
71.
252.

General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Isr.-Egypt, 42 U.N.T.S.

72.
According to the Conclusions du Gouvernement Egyptien, 7 R.E.D.I.
235, 252 (1951), the measures of control had become significantly less stringent.
The amended contraband list is discussed in Thomas D. Brown, Jr., World War
Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restrictions on Neutral
Shipping with Israel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 849, 858 (1966).
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terminate a state of war. 73 Israel and several third states
vigorously protested the continuation of prize action. 7 4 The most
eloquent pronouncement against the legality of these measures
came from the Security Council, on the grounds that the
Armistice Agreement was: "[O]f a permanent character [and
therefore] neither party [can] reasonably assert that it is actively a
belligerent or require[s] to exercise the right of visit, search and
seizure ....-

75

To appreciate the cogency of the conflicting arguments, two
points must be distinguished. First, Egypt was probably correct
under the traditional, and still valid law on Armistice Agreements,
which stipulates that an armistice terminates hostilities, but not
the state of war altogether.7 6 Thus, the Hague Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907
stipulate that "an Armistice suspends military operations by
mutual agreement." 77
Consistent national judicial decisions
endorsing the lawfulness of the exercise of the right of visit,
search, and seizure after the conclusion of an armistice 78 provide
authority for the view that this treaty stipulation is evidence of
customary law on the point. Nevertheless, as a matter of legal
principle, the classification of an agreement is useful only to the
extent that it corresponds to its essence. One must therefore
focus upon the provisions of the particular armistice agreement,
which may derogate from the principle that armistices do not
terminate a state of war. The 1949 Agreement was by its terms
"an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict
and the restoration of peace,"7 9 and under the terms of the 1949

73.
See Egyptian Statement, supra note 70, at 294; see also The S.S. Lea
Lott, 28 I.L.R. 652, 653 (U. Arab Republic Prize Ct. 1959).
74.
See Restrictions on Suez Traffic, TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 1950, at 5;
Australian Protest to Egypt, TIMES (London), July 2, 1951, at 5; EgyptianMinisters'
Declaration,TIMES (London), Aug. 8, 1951, at 3.
75.
S. Res. 2322, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 558th mtg., at 10 (1951).
76.
Cf. S.S. Wimbledon (Brit., Fr., It., Jap., v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 1 at 35-42 (Aug. 17) (dissenting opinion of Judges Anzilotti and Huber).
77.
Convention Concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land [Hague
Convention IV], Oct. 18, 1907, art. 36, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 295.

78.
This is established in English law by two decisions of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. See Schiffahrt-Treuhand v. Her Majesty's
Procurator General, 20 I.L.R. 667, 676 (P.C. 1953); The Rannveig, 1 I.L.R. 435,
436 (P.C. 1920). Contrast The Santa Flavia, 13 I.L.R. 406 (Fr., Conseil des Prises
1946); see also Manfred Lachs, La nouvelle Fonction des Armistices contemporains,
in HOMMAGE D'UNE GEN8RATION DE JURISTES AU PRIeSIDENT BASDEVANT 319

(1960);

Richard R. Baxter, Armistices and other Forms of Cessation of Hostilities, 149
R.C.A.D.I. 353 (1976-I); Howard S. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice
Agreement, 50 AM. J. INT'LL. 880 (1956).
79.
General Armistice Agreement, supra note 71, art. 1(4) (emphasis

added).
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Agreement this constituted a "principle" thereof. 80 While unlikely
in principle, it cannot be excluded that such an instrument would

in itself be sufficient to terminate the exercise of belligerent nonwarlike rights. 8 1
Nevertheless, the Armistice Agreement was certainly intended
to constitute only an intermediate stage because the Egyptian
government was not prepared to undertake negotiations toward
the achievement of a final peace settlement. Indeed, it is not clear
whether it was prepared to negotiate at all with Israel at high
political levels; the Armistice Agreement was negotiated and
concluded by military authorities of the two parties.
The
determination of whether Egypt was prepared to concede at that
stage that the Armistice Agreement was a waiver of belligerent
rights is affected by these considerations, which must be taken
into account in the construction of the Armistice Agreement. Not
insignificantly, a Treaty of Peace, providing expressly for the
termination of the state of war, was finally concluded in 1979,82
whereas in an interim agreement of 1975 the parties agreed not to
83
resort to a "military blockade" against each other.
It follows that if there was something in the Armistice
Agreement that precluded Egypt from taking, or continuing in
exercise of, prize action, it had to be found in the spirit rather
than the express terms of the Armistice Agreement. 84 Even the
1951 Security Council Resolution condemned the pursuit of
belligerent measures as an "abuse of the exercise of the right of
visit, search and seizure."8 5 Such a careful and specific reference
to abuse of rights as the basis of illegality lends support to the
argument that the conduct of Egypt was prima facie lawful; only

80.
Id. art. I, opening para.
81.
Thus, the 1953 Panmunjom Armistice, which contained opening
provisions similar to the ones of the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Agreement,
terminated all blockade action. See Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's
Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers concerning a
Military Armistice in Korea, July 27, 1953, art. 11(15), reprintedin 47 AM. J. INTL L.
Supp. 186 (1953).
82.
Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of
Egypt, Egypt-Isr., Mar. 26, 1979, arts. 11 (1), VI (3) & Annex III, 18 I.L.M. 362
(1979).

83.

Agreement on the Sinai and the Suez Canal, Sept. 4, 1975, Egypt-lsr.,

art. 11, 14 I.L.M. 1450 (1975).

84.

See Cablegramdated 12 June 1951 From the Chief of Staff of the Truce

Supervision Organizationaddressed to the Secretary general, transmittinga report to

the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2194 (1951) (stating that the Egyptian

interference in the Canal was contrary to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement).
The aforementioned document is described in 1951 U.N.Y.B. 293-94, U.N. Sales
No. 1952.1.30.

85.

S.C. Res. 2322, supranote 75,

7.
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under the very specific circumstances could it be held illegal.
Nonetheless, Egypt's bad faith is not to be asserted lightly, 86 nor
87
is it necessary to pass judgment here.
In any event, Egypt maintained the measures in force,
supporting them with the argument that the situation was one of
a latent state of war. 88 The issue was a recurrent source of
strong debate, inside and outside of the Security Council. 89 Israel
considered the matter of such importance that it gave rise to her
denouncement of the Armistice Agreement. 90
The crux of state practice regarding the extremely

complicated situation in the Suez Canal is that the protest of

third states, all presumed "neutral" by Egypt, and who acted as
neutral parties, was principally directed against measures taken
when no significant military operations were actually in progress.

Third

states

did not

abstractly

protest

the assertion

of

belligerency in the absence of armed confrontation. The essence
of their protests was that Egypt hampered the free transit in the
Suez Canal when no armed hostilities were in progress. From
this, one is bound to infer that interference with neutral trade
was impermissible in the absence of warlike operations. In other
words, the validity of belligerency in the context of neutrality was
not seriously objected to-to the extent that it was accompanied
by actual important armed confrontation.

86.
In this respect, it should be borne in mind that at no time did Egypt
attempt to exercise belligerent rights on neutral vessels on the High Seas. See
The Inge Toft, 31 I.L.R. 509, 518 (Egypt Prize Ct. 1964); see also Naiune, Inge Toft,
16 R.E.D.I. 118 (1960); Solomon Yahuda, The Inge Toft Controversy, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 398 (1960).
87.
See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 42-56 (1988);
see also ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 213-216 (1965); Andr6 Gervais, Les Armistices
palestinien, corden et indochinois et leurs Enseignements, 1956 A.F.D.I. 97.
Professor Stone has taken the interesting position that "the insistence of
maintaining the state of belligerency constituted in effect a continuing declaration
of war." JULIUS STONE, THE MIDDLE-EAST UNDER CEASE-FIRE 4 (1967).
88.
See Statements of Egypt to the Security Council described in The
Palestine Question, Complaints considered by the Security Council, Statements of
Egypt to the Security Council, 1954 U.N.Y.B. 62, at 63, U.N. Sales No. 1955.1.25.
89.
See, e.g., 1965 BRITISH PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (E.
Lauterpacht, ed.); see also Question Concerningthe Middle East, 1959 U.N.Y.B. 34,
35-36, U.N. Sales No. 60.1.1; Charles Rousseau, Chronique des Faits
internationaux,63 R.G.D.I.P. 515-517 (1959); 64 R.G.D.I.P. 621-622 (1960); 71
R.G.D.I.P. 186 (1967). A useful work of a more descriptive character is ISTVAN S.
POGANY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1984).
90.
See the relevant documents in I ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967: THE MIDDLE EAST 109-117 (1969).
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B. The Kashmir War of 196591
The 1965 war commenced with sporadic fighting in May
1965, which gradually escalated and ultimately led to a radio
announcement by the Pakistani President on September 6, 1965,
in which he stated: "We are at war."9 2 The Paldstani authorities
considered the announcement to be a formal declaration of war9 3
and proceeded to issue an Executive Order containing an
extensive list of contraband of war. 9 4
Prize Courts were
established, and a limited number of cargoes were seized as
enemy goods, 95 owing to the short duration of the clash. 96 Some
belonged to subjects of neutral states, although the term is

employed here merely to designate nonparticipant states, since
only Ceylon (as it then was) officially proclaimed and observed
neutrality. 9 7 No solemn protests against those measures were
monitored during the short period of the war, 98 but precisely
because of the brevity of the clash, it is unsafe to infer general
acquiescence from this stance. Moreover, it is not clear whether
the arms sales restrictions that the United States and United
Kingdom imposed9 9 resulted from a perceived legal duty, separate
and distinct from policy considerations.
Thus, there is no

91.

The 1971 three-week war between India and Pakistan did not raise

any concrete problems relating to neutrality. See Philippe Bretton, De quelques
Probl6mes du Droit de la Guerre dans le Conflit indo-pakistanais,1972 A.F.D.I. 201,
206-09.
92.
Charles Rousseau, Chronique des faits intenationaux, 70 R.G.D.I.P.
179-80 (1996). See generally the "chronology" contained in the judgment of Kerr,
J. in Dalmia Diary Industries v. National Bank of Pakistan, [1978] Lloyd's Rep.
223, at 271 (Q.B.).
93.
Cf. Government of Pakistan v. R.S.N. Co., Ltd., 40 I.L.R. 472 (Pak. High
Ct. 1965); In re Reference No. 1 of 1965, 53 I.L.R. 613, 614-15, 623 (1979)
(W. Pak. High Ct. 1966). However, an arbitrator later found that the President's
speedh was not addressed to India and did not, moreover, purport to be a
declaration of war. Dalmia Cement Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan, 67 I.L.R.
611 (1984), reprinted in 3 VINCENT COUSSIRAT-COUST8RE & PIERRE EISENMANN,
RPPERTOIRE DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ARBITRALE INTERNATIONALE § 3511 (1991) (Int'l
Comm. Arb.); see paras. 8-10 of the preliminary award.
94.
See Proclamation as to Contraband of War (Pakistan), Sept. 9, 1965,
XVII-6 THE ALL PAKIsTAN LEGAL DECISIONS 437 (1965).
95.
See Ship Lines may face Claims, TIMES (London), Oct. 4, 1965, at 10;
Indian Tea Disputegoes to Dacca Court, TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 1965, at 19.
96.
The war was terminated by the Final Declaration of the Conference of
Tashkent, Jan. 10, 1966, India-Pak., 70 R.G.D.I.P. 188 (1966). The contraband

legislation had, however, been relaxed by December 1965.
97.

Note that the Security Council had not designated the aggressor party.

See generally Questions Relating to Asia and the Far East 1965 U.N.Y.B. 159,

Sales No. 66.11.
98.
But see 1 BRITISH PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (E. Lauterpacht
ed. 1965)
99.
See SIPRI, supranote 45, at 58, 484-85.
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evidence that the conflict was generally regarded as "war" by third
states, at least for the purposes of neutrality.
The appreciation of the Indian position requires caution.
Although India too exercised prize action,1 0 0 India did not declare
Later, however, India officially
war or admit its existence.
contested the lawflulness of Pakistan's reliance on a state of war
for the latter's prize action on the grounds that declaring war was
itself a manifestation of aggression incompatible with the U.N.
Charter.101 The logical conclusion and practical effect of the
Indian position would be a blanket denial of the application of the
law of neutrality in undeclared wars. 102 With hindsight, however,
it is a tenable assumption that India's position was intended to
serve as an ex post facto justification for her extensive attacks on
third states' shipping on the High Seas1 0 3 rather than a general
statement on law.
Similarly, since the conflict had escalated well before any
Pakistani official declaration of war,10 4 one presumes that the
Pakistani declaration was issued for no apparent reason other
than to secure the lawfulness of measures intended to cripple its
opponent's external trade.
The legal manifestation of this
phenomenon is the enactment of exhaustive lists of contraband
items. 10 5 In that sense, the supposed Pakistani declaration of
war, if such indeed it was, served as a tool of strategy that
purported to invoke the application of the rules of neutrality, and
Prize Law in particular. This conclusion is perhaps corroborated
by the repetition of the same pattern of conduct by both states in
1 °6
the 1971 war.

100. See supra note 98.
101. See LORD McNAIR & A.D. WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 457 (1966)
(quoting Indian statement in the Security Council).
102. Cf. SURYA P. SHARMA, THE INDO-PAKISTAN MARITIME CONFLICT: A LEGAL
APPRAISAL 87 (1970) (quoting Indian Statement in the Security Council).

103. On such attacks, see D.P. O'Connell, Limited War at Sea since 1945, in
RESTRAINTS ON WAR 123, 129 (Michael Howard ed., 1979).
104. See CARVER, supranote 48, 223-25.
105. See supra note 94. One gets the impression that there is a general
tendency of absorption of the notion of contraband by a broader notion of

"unneutral service." Cf. infra Part III.C.2. This is perhaps a follow-up of World
War Two practice of both the Allied and the Axis Powers. See, e.g., Dietrich
Schindler, Aspects contemporains de la Neutralitd, 121 R.C.A.D.I. 219, 235 (1967-

II).
106. See Belligerent Interference With Neutral Commerce, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
386-387 (1972) (excerpting Pakistan's and India's proclamation of contraband,

respectively).
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C. The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-881o7
The eight-year conflict between Iran and Iraq' 0 8 gave new
impetus to neutrality as a valid and useful legal concept.
Although war was never officially declared, this was, it will be
recalled, a long and onerous conflict featuring fierce fighting. In
the absence of a Security Council Resolution limiting the
alternatives of third states, they remained essentially free to
determine their own position. It is worth noting, however, that
the Security Council recommended, in its first Resolution after
fighting began, that third states "refrain from any act which may
lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict."' 0 9
Thus, it may not be ruled out that neutrality was actually one of
the positions envisaged and recommended by the Security
Council in that instance.
Furthermore, it was a general
preference of the world community that fighting be confined to the
parties already engaged,' 1 0 and the flow of oil through the
important waterway of the Persian Gulf not be hindered. These
concerns must be borne in mind in the examination of the
position of third states.
1. The Position Third States Adopted, with Special Reference to
Supplies of Arms and Other Military Equipment"'
The expeditious fashion and unequivocal terms in which
important world players adopted a neutral position in the conflict

107.

For an analysis of the position of various states, and official

documents, see THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
(Andrea De Guttry & Natalino Ronzitti, eds., 1993) [hereinafter IRAN-IRAQ WAR].

108.

Following tension throughout the year, full-scale fighting broke out

after a major Iraqi attack on several fronts on September 21, 1980. See Iran-Iraq,
27 KEESING'S REc. OF WORLD EVENTS 31005, 31006 (1981).

A U.N.-sponsored

cease-fire was accepted by both parties in 1988. For Iraq's acceptance of the
cease-fire, see Letter dated 6 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of
Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. S/20092
(1988). For Iran's acceptance of the cease-fire, see Letter dated 7 August 1988
from the Ministerof the Islamic Republic of IranAddressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/20094 (1988). For the Security Council's endorsement of the ceasefire, see Note for the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/20096 (1988).

109.
110.

S.C. Res. 479, U.N. SCOR, 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res./479 (1980).
Cf. The Community at the United Nations, 1981-9 BULL. OF THE EUR.

COMMUNITIES 75, 75-78 (statements of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers
of the European Community in the Security Council).

111.

The meaning of the term "military equipment" varied from state to

state. See SIR RICHARD ScoTT, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO EXPORTS OF DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT AND DUAL-USE GOODS TO IRAQ, AND RELATED PROSECUTIONS 154 passim

(1996).
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is impressive." 2
The United States," 3 Soviet Union, 1 4 and
5
China," all formally characterized the conflict as war and stated
that they would observe a "strict" attitude of neutrality. The
United Kingdom drafted its position in somewhat milder, yet
unequivocal, terms: "[The United Kingdom is] neutral in the war
between Iran and Iraq."" 6 As a matter of abstention attendant
upon neutrality, execution of all outstanding contractual
obligations that would impair this position, notably contracts for
the sale of "lethal equipment~" 7 and for the training of military
personnel" 8 were prohibited. France was the only permanent
member of the Security Council not to proclaim neutrality" 9 and
120
to honor obligations to provide military equipment to Iraq.

Belgium and Italy also refrained at this initial stage from adopting
1 1
an official neutral position.
The terminology employed in formal statements gradually
changed, however.
For example, the United Kingdom later
affirmed its "impartial" position in the "conflict."' 2 2 Similar terms

finally

appeared

in

European

Community

23

and

Security

112. Some Arab states, such as Jordan and Kuwait, openly aligned with
Iraq. See Iran-Iraq, 27 KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 31005, 31009-31010
(1981).
113.
See Iran-IraqConflict: President'sStatement, DEP" ST. BULL., Nov. 1980,
at 53, 61; see also Conflict in Iran and Iraq, id. at 52; Review of Developments in the
Middle East, DEP'r ST. BULL. Mar. 1986, at 39, 41; U.S. to Extend Protection to
Neutral Ships in PersianGulf,DEP'r ST. BULL., July 1988, at 61.
114.
See Iran-Iraq,27 KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 31005, 31011 (1981)
115.
See Statements of China to the Security Council, Mtg. 2546 (June 6,
1984) described in Asia and the Pacific, Iran-Iraq Conflict, Security Council Action
(June), 1984 U.N.Y.B. 234, U.N. Sales No. E.87.1.1.
116.
Statement of the Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Dec. 22, 1982, 34 PARL. DEB., H.C. 608-609 (1982); see 20 PARL. DEB., H.C. 297
(1982). Compare the British position with the Australian position in Law of the
Sea, 10 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 414 (1981-1983).
117.
For the official position of various states in that regard, see statements
of the respective states in 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 559 (1982). See also 54 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. (1983); 118 PARL. DEB., H.C. 483 (1987). Cf. Iran-IraqWar, DEPT. ST. BULL.
Sept. 1982, at 59 (announcing the disapproval of sale of American Military
equipment to either belligerent); 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 417 (1985); 25 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 459-460 (1987).
118.
See 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 597 (1984).
119.
See 1982 A.F.D.I. 1095.
120.
See [1981] A.F.D.I. 854; [1984] A.F.D.I. 952; [1988] A.F.D.I. 901.
121.
See 19 R.B.D.I. 150-151 (1986); see also 7 IT. Y.B. INT'L L. 470-471

(1986-1987).
122.
See Neutrality, non-belligerency-legalnotice of neutrality, 56 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 534 (1985); see also Neutrality, non-belligerency-legalnotice of neutralitysea warfare, 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 638 (1987).
123.
See Political and Institutional Matters, 1987-1 BULL. OF THE EUR.
COMMUNITIES 62.
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Council 124 decisions. This notwithstanding, one may agree with
Dr. Christine Gray that no substantial change was intended
insofar as substantive duties of neutrality were concerned. 125
What must be noted is that the formal adoption of a neutral
position

in

a

conflict

involving

large-scale

hostilities

was

considered a permissible legal stance.
In other words, the
conditions for the application of neutrality were deemed fulfilled.
From the Iran-Iraq war discussion, it is also important to note
that, in the view of third parties, the adoption of a neutral stance
was not considered a requirement flowing from the reality of the
conflict. In other words, the evidence shows that neutrality was a
lawful, or permissible, position, but hot a mandatory one.
Although it is not the task of lawyers to discover the political
motives behind the major world players' unprecedented
convergence of opinion, at least at the formal level, it is probable
that the adoption of a neutral stance was prompted by the wish to
protect oil cargoes destined for third states. To this issue one
must now turn.
12 6
2. The Protection of Neutral Shipping in the Gulf

As will be recalled, a distinctive feature of the 1980-88 Gulf
War was the indiscriminate attacks on ships in the vicinity,
regardless of their state of registration and destination: the great
majority of the more than four hundred vessels attacked were
flying third states' flags. 12 7 These attacks upon commercial
shipping were repeatedly condemned in Security Council
Resolutions 552 (1984), 582 (1986), and 598 (1987).128 The

Resolutions do not explicitly refer to the specific rule of law
prohibiting attacks on innocent commercial shipping of third
states on the High Seas, perhaps because of the well-established

124.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 552, U.N. SCOR, 5 S/Res/552 (1984) (spealdng of
"states . . . no[n] parties to the hostilities"); see also Statement of the Security
CouncilPresident,U.N. Doc. S/ 18610 (1987); S.C. Res. 620, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.

S/Res/620 (1986).
125.
Christine Gray, The British Position in Regard to the Gulf Conflict, 37
INT'L & CoUP. L.Q. 420, 421 (1988); Christine Gray, The British Positionin Regard
to the Gulf Conflict: Part2, 40 INT & COmP. L.Q. 463 (1991).
126.
See Eric David, La Guerre du Gofe et le DroitInternational,20 R.B.D.I.
153 (1987).
127.
For more details, see John H. McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime
Sanctions: The Effect of Two Gulf Wars, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 631-32 (1991).
128.
See S.C. Res. 552, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/552 (1984); S.C. Res.
582, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/582 (1986); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, U.N.

Doc. S/Res/598 (1987).
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and customary nature of that rule.1 2 9 Nonetheless, the freedom
of navigation on the High Seas in the Persian Gulf was a
predominant interest of third states and the international
community generally.1 3 0
Following the official adoption of a
neutral position, important naval powers dependent on oil
imports from the Gulf states deployed protection fleets in the
131
Indian Ocean to protect the Strait of Hormuz oil route.
Protection was originally afforded exclusively to vessels flying the
national flag of the respective fleet, but the United States later
went further to announce that it would provide protection to
"neutral vessels" generally. 13 2
Although the "innocence" of the flag state would certainly be
a prerequisite for patrolling action, which innocence the
neutrality declarations thus purported to attribute, 13 3 the legal
basis for the patrolling action itself is not entirely clear. The
United Kingdom1 3 4 and France13 5 expressly invoked their right of
self-defense, implying that the obligations under the U.N. Charter
qualify, or even require, an entirely different legal basis for the
exercise of traditional war-related rights. An alternative basis
could arguably be provided by implied authorization embodied in
the aforesaid Security Council Resolutions.1 3 6 The position of the
United States in this matter is ambiguous, not resting clearly on
137
either possible ground.
In contrast, with regard to neutral duties, the evidence
demonstrates that nonparticipant states acknowledged the

129. See The Cysne (Port. v. Ger.), 5 ANN. DIG. 487, 490 (1929-1930) (ad
hoc arbitral award); see also Doenitz, XXII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL 558-59 (1948); Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Self-

Defence, Enforcement Action and the Gulf Wars, 1980-88 and 1990-91, 62 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 299, 327-333 (1992).
130. See, e.g., Navigation-LibrePassage dans le Golfe Persique et le Droit
D'ormuz, [1981] A.F.D.I. 895 (Fr.); DEPrI ST. BULL., Dec. 1980, at 73; 9-1987 BULL.
OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, at 74; see also Report to Congress on Security
Arrangements in the PersianGulf, 26 I.L.M. 1433, 1435 (1987) [hereinafter the
Weinberger Report]; U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2493d mtg.,
3, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/540 (1983).
131. 27 Iran-Iraq,KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 31005, 31011 (1981).
132. 34 KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 36169 (1988).
133. For instance, in a Communiqud on September 14, 1987, the Belgian
Government advocated "sastricte neutralit", 22 R.B.D.I. 427 (1989), after which it
proceeded to ajoint mine-sweeping operation with Italy and the Netherlands. See
R.C.R. Siclanarm, Netherlands State Practicefor the ParliamentaryYear 1987-1988,
20 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 183 (1989); see also IRAN-IRAQ WAR, supranote 107, at
448.
134. See United Kingdom Materials on InternationalLaw, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 487, 583 (1986).
135. See Libre Navigation dans le Golfe, [1988] A.F.D.I. 964.
136. ContraCHINKIN, supranote 37, at 307-08.
137.

See Weinberger Report, supranote 130, at 1454.
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belligerents' right of visit and search. The legal justifications,
however, were divergent. The Permanent Representative of the
Netherlands to the U.N. aptly summarized the position of the
majority of third states when he stated to the Security Council
that "under International Law belligerents may take measures to

restrict

shipping

belligerents." 138

to

and

from

the

ports

of the

other

The United Kingdom's qualified position on the

other hand acknowledged that:
[A] state actively engaged in an armed conflict . .. is entitled in

exercise of its inherent right to self-defense, to stop and search a
foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable
ground for suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side
13 9
in the conflict.

Evidently, the legal position of the United Kingdom has the effect
of denying the validity of the laws of war and neutrality as the
legal bases of the right of visit and search, considering this right to
140
be an emanation or a facet of the right of self-defense.
The essential point, however, is that the majority of third
states conceded that the law of neutrality applies when an armed
conflict reaches certain proportions; or, in other words, the Gulf
conflict constituted "war," at least for the purposes of neutrality.
The acknowledgment that belligerent measures against neutrals
are lawful in times of actual hostilities where war has not been
declared must be stressed, for up to that time there had been
learned scholarly opinion against it. 141
There is also evidence that the belligerents did not contest
that third states' vessels navigating the Gulf were in principle
entitled to the safety that the law accords to neutral vessels. The
consecration by the belligerents of "war" or "exclusion" zones,
doubtful as their legality may be, 14 2 signifies that neutrals' rights
were not per se challenged. These zones constituted a pledge that
merchant vessels therein would enjoy safety in passage-although

138. U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2546 (1984) (emphasis
added). Cf. Netherlands State Practice, 13 NETH. Y.B. INTL L. 175, 259 (1982)

(noting that the right to free navigation on seas is sometimes subject to
restrictions when a coastal state is at war).

139.

Statement of the Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 127

PARL. DEB., H.C. 424 (1988) (emphasis added) (repeating an earlier statement

from 90 PARL. DEB., H.C. 426 (1986)).
140. See Christopher Greenwood, Remarks, 83 ASIL PROC. 158, 159 (1988).
141. See, e.g., 2 WILHELM WENGLER, VOLKERRECHT 1467 (1964); Schindler,
supranote 105, at 293.
142. See generally W.J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of
Naval Warfare, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 91 (1986) (arguing for restraint in the usage of
zone devices during wars); Ross Leckow, The Iran-IraqConflict in the Gulf. The Law
of War Zones, 37 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 629 (1988) (arguing for respect for laws of
humanity in war zones).
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this pledge was not always respected. Because these zones were
intended for general use, 143 one may assume that all
nonparticipant states were entitled to the safety accorded to
neutrals. This is also supported by a statement of the Iranian
Ambassador to Belgium, who, on the occasion of an attack
against a vessel flying the Belgian flag in 1985 condemned "toute
violation ... du droit internationaltelle que les attaques contre les
navires neutres."144 At that stage, however, Belgium had not
14
proclaimed neutrality. S
Further corroboration of the above findings is provided by the
fact that the lawfulness of other measures taken by the
belligerents was also assessed by the standards of neutrality.
Such standards were applied to Iran's claim that nonparticipant
states' vessels carrying petroleum to and from Kuwait were
subject to attack, 146 since Kuwait (the state of destination, but
not the state of the vessel) had forfeited-so the argument goesits protection as a neutral by granting economic assistance which
would eventually sustain Iraq's war effort. 147 These standards

should also apply to Iraqi attacks on third states' ships carrying
oil to and from Iran.
It must be remembered that few, if any, of the states that

advocated a position of "strict neutrality" observed it fully. 148 On
this premise, Ronzitti wrote that "[m]ost third states adopted a
policy of non-belligerency rather than observing the stance of

143.
See the statement of facts in In re The Good Luck, Bank of Nova Scotia
v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd., 3 All E.R. 1 (H.L.)
(1991).

144.

20 R.B.D.I. 366 (1987).

145.
See supranote 121.
146. It is a persistent question whether military action, be it lawful, against
neutral vessels or territory, should be termed as 'belligerent reprisals' or not. Cf.
Coenca Freres v. 2tat Allemand, 7 TRIB. ARB. MIXTES 683 (1928) It is difficult to
reconcile the prevailing view that action in self-defense may never constitute
reprisals, see Derek W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972), with current state practice, notably in the Gulf War,
that belligerent action must in any event be justified on the basis of self-defense.
147.
See 28 KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 31523 (1982); see also Iranian
Law Regarding the Settlement of Disputes over War Prizes, Sept. 17, 1987, Art.
3(a), reprintedin D. Momtaz, Commentary: Iran, in IRAN-IRAQ WAR, supranote 107,
19, at 39; Letter Dated 25 May 1984 from the PermanentRepresentative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, 39th Sess., U. N. Doc. S/16585
(1984); Text of the Enclosure Submitted by the Charge d'affaires of the Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/18557 (1986).
148.
See, e.g., View of the European Community Member states, EUR. PARL.
DEB. (350) 161 (1987). See generally 28 KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 3152131522 (1982). According to the Scott Report, the United Kingdom observed the
obligations she undertook. See SCOTT, supranote 111, at 336-37 & 367.
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impartiality required by neutrality."14 9 But state practice, as has
been demonstrated, did not support the existence of any
intermediate legal notion between belligerency and neutrality.
Rather, the duties and rights of belligerents and third parties
were stated in, and evaluated in accordance with, the classical
standards of the law of neutrality. And, generally, it is not cogent
to state that the law evolves in content or is plainly breached, as a
distinct legal rule.
In conclusion, although an examination of the positions of
the belligerents and third states shows that the existence of a
formal state of war was far from certain,' 5 0 this fact had no
bearing at all on the application of the law of neutrality. Further,
the conflict reasserted the need for neutrality as an institution
providing protection for nonbelligerents' interests in areas of
intense and protracted hostilities. It served as a test-bed for the
feasibility and adaptability of traditional notions and rules to new
circumstances, particularly the possible need for broadening the
notion of "unneutral service" to cover commercial intercourse
between third states that may ultimately result in strengthening
the economy of the belligerents.
D. The Conflict in the Falklands
Following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, a
British dependent territory, on April 1, 1982, and the failure of
attempts to reach a mediated settlement, hostilities of
considerable intensity broke out between Argentina and the
United Kingdom. Fighting started in late April and involved the
demployment of significant naval power, as well as infantry units.
An Instrument of Surrender was signed by the two Military
Commanders on June 14, 1982.151
Despite the fact that
diplomatic relations between the two states had been severed
throughout the conflict and the United Kingdom applied war-time
legislation, it is clear that the United Kingdom considered itself
not to be "at war" with Argentina at any point.' 5 2 This, however,
proved to be irrelevant for the purposes of neutrality. Third states
classified the situation as an armed conflict, allowing for, or
necessitating the application of, the law of neutrality. This

149. See supranote 107.
150. See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modem
InternationalLaw, 36 INTL & COmP. L.Q. 283, 293-94 (1987).
151. See 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 526-27 (1982), for a reproduction of the
instrument.
152. See Statement of Prime Minister Thatcher, 22 PARL. DEB., H.C. 616
(1982).
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53
classification was also conceded by the United Kingdom,'
allowing for, or necessitating the application of, the law of
neutrality. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the
liberty of third states to determine their own position was
unlimited, as the Security Council did not determine the
4
aggressor party in Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982).15
The attitude of Latin American states that were directly
concerned by an armed conflict in their vicinity is most
significant. Some of them lent their support to the Argentine
claim as to the merits of the underlying territorial dispute, but
very few openly supported Argentina's military action.1 ss Others,
while endorsing the Argentine claim to the islands, openly
condemned the action.' 5 6 Chile officially declared that it would
observe neutrality, forbidding the United Kingdom fleet from
using its port facilities in the area,' 5 7 a position perfectly
compatible with the rule evinced in Article 18 of Convention
XIII.' 5 8 Similar positions of neutrality were adopted by Brazil s 9
and South Africa' 6 0-states that also could have potentially been
involved.
The European Community member states, albeit
without prejudice to the merits of the Argentine claim, adopted
measures against it and put in place a blanket prohibition on all
imports' 6 1 and a special prohibition on the export of arms.162

153.

See United Kingdom Materials on InternationalLaw, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L

L., 337, 519-20 & 538 (1982).

154.

See S.C. Res. 502, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/502 (1982); S.C. Res.

505, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/505 (1982).
155.
Only Panama and Nicaragua openly supported Argentina.
156.
Among the states condemning Argentina's action were Colombia, Peru,
Guatemala and Bolivia.
157.
28 KEESING'S REc. OF WORLD EVENTs 31534 (1982); see also 1982
U.N.Y.B. 1331. A statement of the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated April
2, 1982 reasserts Chile's "traditional compliance with the rules of International
Law" in view of "the grave factual situation in the area." In the event, Chile lent a
tanker to the British fleet. See Task Force Ship owned by Chile, TIMES (London),
Apr. 29, 1982, at 6.
158.
See Hague Convention XIII, supranote 13, art. 18.
159.
28 KEESING'S REc. OF WORLD EVENTS 31534 (1982).
160.
See The Falkland Islands Dispute, 8 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 265, 266

(1982).
161.
162.

See Council Regulation 877/82, 1982 O.J. (L102) 1.
See Community Solidarity in the FalklandsConflict, 1982-4 BULL. OF THE
EUR. COMMUNITIES, at 7-8.
For national implementing measures, see 11982]
A.F.D.I. 1092-1094; [1983] A.F.D.I. 913 (Fr.); R.C.R. Sickmann, Netherlands State
Practicefor the ParliamentaryYear 1981-1982, 14 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 245, 329-30
(1983).
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163
Similar measures were also adopted by the United States,
164
which had initially sought to remain neutral.
The law of neutrality was also applied by a U.S. federal court
in a case involving a Liberian vessel, which was hit by Argentine
forces during the conflict. The court found accordingly the attack
was in violation of the neutral status of the vessel and accordingly
the Argentine state incurred liability toward the shipowners. 165
The example of the Falkland islands conflict clearly indicates
the irrelevance of a formal state of war to the application of the
law of neutrality. State practice seems to uphold the existence of
armed conflict as a criterion of applicability provided the conflict
is of a certain intensity and magnitude. It also indicates that the
determination of the nature of the conflict by the belligerents is
not conclusive nor binding on third states for the purposes of
bringing about the regime of neutrality.

E. Concluding Remarks on State Practice
In modem state practice, the status of neutrality remains, in
a number of respects, unclear. It has been demonstrated thus far
that, despite the usefulness of neutrality as an institution in
limiting the effects of warfare on third parties, 16 6 states
extraneous to a conflict do not readily adopt a neutral position.
State practice is therefore not entirely conclusive as to the
mandatory or optional character of the law of neutrality, although
the latter seems to be the better position. A clear lesson is
provided, however, regarding the circumstances in which
neutrality is applicable as a permissible legal status. The Author
submits that modem state practice does not support the
dependence of neutrality on a state of war brought about by a
declaration of war or an assertion of belligerency, at least in the
absence of actual and persistent organized armed confrontation.
This applies to both neutral rights and duties. For reasons set
forth below, however, this conclusion is insufficient. It must be
elaborated and explained with the greatest possible degree of legal
precision.

163. See The South Atlantic Crisis: Background,
Documentation, DEP'r ST. BULL., Oct. 1982, at 80.

Consequences,

164.
See An Ally not an Umpire, TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 1982, at 7.
165.
See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1987).
166.
See O'Connell, supranote 103, at 130.
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THE RELEVANCE OF WAR AND ARMED CONFLICT TO NEUTRALITY
PROPER OR THE REQUISITES OF NEUTRALITY

It has been well demonstrated that legal implications
constitute a major policy consideration in matters of war. 16 7 As
described in the analysis of state practice above, the application
of the law of neutrality in particular has entered the
considerations of waging war itself.
Thus, the Pakistani
declaration of war (and possibly the Egyptian assertion of
belligerency) was intended to trigger the application of the Law of
Prize, which would permit the attainment, through legal means, of
the important strategic aim of severely limiting the opponent's
external trade. Nonetheless, two desiderata must be taken into
account. First, the objective nature of legal rules, a corollary of
their regulatory role, must impose limits upon considerations of
strategy or policy in the application of the law.
Second,
obligations of good faith bearing upon the belligerent parties are
particularly
acute when their actions
have
important
repercussions on the rights and obligations of third parties. It
should therefore be a concern of the analysis to eliminate the
uncertainty that continues to surround the relation between
neutrality and the generic concept of war with a view to
minimizing the potential for abusive application of the law of
neutrality. The methodology of the exercise will be deductive.
Although any systematic exposition of the requirements of
neutrality as evinced in state practice must start with the
concepts of "armed conflict" and "state of war" traditionally
utilized by publicists, these concepts must not impose undue
restraints. Generally, the determination of the meaning and the
requirements of a legal norm must be a function of the purpose of
the norm, 16 8 not of set legal categories and concepts. For such
concepts are useful only to convey the essence of the law, not to
restrict it.
A. The Requirement of Actual Fighting
State practice has demonstrated that in cases where the
existence of a state of war was uncertain (e.g., the Gulf War) or
even denied (e.g., the Falklands Conflict) the law of neutrality

167.
See generally D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER
16-26 (1975) (discussing the interaction of law and naval policy).
168. The locus classicusis 1 RUDOLPH VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT 433

(1877).
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The application of this law was never
nonetheless applied.
intended to constitute a recognition of belligerency, whether
apposite to all purposes or restricted to the law of neutrality.
Neutrality and state of war have thus been dissociated.
The examples discussed above demonstrate that neutrality is
dependent upon the existence of actual fighting. Although this
last statement will be qualified below, 169 it is accurate to say that
actual fighting is the first requirement for the application of
neutrality law. The condition of actual fighting would seem to
result from the role neutrality continues to play as a means to
dissuade belligerents from the continuation of their armed
struggle. The absence of support for the belligerents is not merely
a sign of lenity, but of the fact that the international community
refrains from encouraging belligerency, or more generally, war as
a means of dispute settlement. The most persuasive means of

dissuasion in this connection would be the discontinuance of
70

military supplies to the belligerents. 1
Moreover, without support the battlefield will inevitably be
localized, and the parties eventually exhausted, as seems to have
been the case in the Iran-Iraq war. The proposition that such
aims are furthered by the institution of neutrality is supported by
a Resolution of the Institut de Droit Internationalon the issue of
Although it is not settled
nonintervention in civil wars. 17 1
whether neutrality applies in such conflicts, the duties of third
states as codified in this resolution are similar, if not identical, to
the duties of neutrals in international conflicts. 17 2 Significantly,
those duties arise according to Article 1(1) of the resolution in
case of "any armed conflict."17 3
Thus, the application of neutrality may provide a "standstill,"
which would permit the fulfillment of the political conditions
necessary for the Security Council to adopt the appropriate
measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Along the same
line of reasoning, it has correctly been suggested that the
observance of neutrality is a duty when the Security Council
adopts no binding decision and a third state is unable to identify
the aggressor. 17 4 Finally, the mission of neutral powers-as

169.
170.

See infra Part IV.C.
See 4 PHILIP C. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY, ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW:

TODAY AND TOMORROW 212 (1936).

171.

See Resolution of the Institut de Droift International on the Principle of

Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, 56 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
[ANN. I.D.I.] 544 (1975: Wiesbaden Session).

172.
173.

Id. art. 2.
Id. art 1(1).

174.

See D.W. BoWETn, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180

(1958);

PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 205 (1948); see also supra Part III.C.
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disinterested parties in the conflict-is notable both on the
diplomatic 175 and humanitarian levels. 17 6
The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the
concept of armed conflict, very much in the sense of the Geneva
Conventions on the Law of Warfare, is indeed relevant to
neutrality as a prerequisite for its application. In other words,
neutrality, as an institution that serves to prevent escalation,
seeks to regulate not a state of war in the abstract, but actual
armed conflict. It will be recalled that despite the fact that Greece
has considered a "technical state of war" to exist between itself
and Albania for over fifty-five years, 177 Greece has never required
any state to observe neutrality towards the parties.
This is not to suggest, however, that neutrality may apply in
all armed conflicts without further qualification. In contrast with
the Laws of Warfare, neutrality does not exclusively serve

humanitarian imperatives, which must be respected regardless of
the scope of the conflict. 178 The observance of neutral duties is a
severe limitation of state sovereignty that is not to be lightly
asserted or presumed. Similar considerations have prevailed in
the drafting of the Resolution of the Institut on the effect of war on
treaties. Article 1 reads:
For the purposes of the Resolution, the term "armed conflict"
means a state of war or an international armed conflict including
armed operations which by theirnature and extent are likely to have
consequences on the application of treaties . . . regardless of a
formal declaration of war or other determination by either of the

parties.

179

175. See RICHARD LATTER & DIETRICH SCHINDLER, THE FUTURE OF NEUTRALITY
INEUROPE 23-24 (The Wilton Park Papers 41, 1991).
176. For illustrations of such missions, see Articles 109 et seq. of the
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supranote 10.
177. See The Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 29 (Apr. 9, 1949);
Memorial of Albania (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Corfu Channel) 48-49;
see also J. Spiropoulos, Sur PExistence de l'Etat de Guerre entre la Grdce et
l'Albanie, 1 REVUE HELL9NIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 370 (1948). The Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty signed in March 1996 does not necessarily entail, or imply,

the termination of the state of war. See Press Release of the Greek Embassy in

London, Apr. 3, 1996.
178.
Cf. COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 33
(Jean S. Pictet, ed. 1952).
179.
Resolution of the Institut de Droit Internationalon the Effect of War on

Treaties, 61-I ANN. I.D.I. 206 (1985: Helsinki Session) (emphasis added). An
earlier Draft Resolution required that the conflict be "of sufficient gravity." 59-Il
ANN. L.D. 1, 206 (1981: Dijon Session).
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The existence of armed hostilities, which constitute the
notion of armed conflict, is therefore an essential, but not
sufficient, requirement.' 8 0
B. The Notion of the 'State of GeneralizedHostilities"
In state practice, the application of neutrality depends upon
certain characteristics of the conflict. These characteristics may
be fairly encapsulated in a concept of "generalized state of
hostilities." This term corresponds in substance to the frequently
employed term "war in the material sense," which describes a

state of affairs involving persistent organized fighting regardless of

whether war has been declared.1 8 1 In other words, it is the
condition initiated and preserved by persistent organized
fighting-as distinct from the mere occurrence of fighting, which
constitutes an armed conflict. 18 2
The term preferred here,
however, is more useful because it does not allude to the disputed
and ambiguous concept of the state of war, which is, as has been
discussed, irrelevant for the purposes of neutrality.
It will be remarked that if the opinion is followed that such a
concept as "state of war" does indeed exist, is of general relevance,
and may only be an objective one, (i.e., determined by recourse to
facts)' 8 3 the same practical result is obtained as far as the law of
neutrality is concerned.
Professor Brownlie in particular,
adopting an objective conception of the concept of war, comes to
the conclusion that: "The law of neutrality with its far-reaching
effects on international relations should only be brought into
operation when the hostilities have a degree of permanence and a
scope which necessitate regulation of the relations of the
18 4
belligerents and third states."
Granting the merits of an objective conception of the state of
war, the notion of a state of generalized hostilities has been
adopted here because it is not within the ambit of this work to
examine whether such an objective concept is current in state

180. But see Dietrich Schindler, State of War, Belligerency,Armed Conflict, in
THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OFARMED CONFLICT 3, 15 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
181. See KOTZSH, supra note 63.
182. Compare the terminology used in Duties of States in the Event of the
Outbreak of Hostilities,G.A. Res. 378(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 308th plen. mtg.

(1950).
183. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Robert W.
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966); INGRID DETTER DE LuPis, THE LAw OF WAR 23-24 (1987);
Richard R. Baxter, The Definition of War, 16 R.E.D.I. 1 (1960); Thomas Baty,
Abuse of Terms: 'Recognition' 'War', 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 381 (1936).
184. BROWNLIE, supranote 3, at 401, 396.
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practice and appropriate for all purposes.1 8 5 It should not be
ignored, however, that a declaration of war may be decisive for
purposes other than neutrality.' 8 6 Once it is established that
Brownlie's above-quoted policy-indication corresponds to the
essence of the law as it currently stands, which is the contention
of this Article, it is unnecessary for the purposes of this Article to
ask what the true nature of the concept of the state of war is.
A state of generalized hostilities, in the context of an
international armed conflict, is brought about by the participation
of state forces. More precisely, there is a requirement that the
operations be conducted under the auspices of state authority,
which establishes a state's responsibility therefor. 187 Potential
participation of paramilitary forces would not therefore eo ipso
deprive the conflict of the character of an international armed
conflict in which neutrality may apply. As to the characteristics
of the conflict itself, there is definitely a requirement that the
conflict be of a certain magnitude. This magnitude is a function
of a number of elements: persistence of fighting over time,
intensity of fighting, number of forces participating, span of the
theater of operations, and so forth. Every conflict, however, as a
factual situation, is a unicum. In any given case, the above
elements will complement each other in quasi-infinite
combinations. No exact proportions of one or another element
may be a priori required. For this reason, every case must be

judged on its own merits.
State practice-as far as it has been possible to researchsupports the case-by-case nature of the determination of whether
a given conflict justifies the application of neutrality. During the

185. It seems, however, that the notion of "war" in a material sense is
gaining currency in practice. In at least 22 Agreements concluded by the
European Communities there is a standard term allowing for derogation "in times
of war." See, e.g., Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic
Community and the Syrian Arab Republic, art. 42(c), 1978 O.J. (L 269) 2; Sixth

International Tin Agreement, art. 48(5), 1982 O.J. (L 342) 3; Agreement between
the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community

Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement, art. 16(2), 1990
O.J. (L 68) 3; see also S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc S/Res/242 (1967)
(discussing the "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war").
186.
See infra note 216.
187.
Cf. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, paras. 69-77 (May 24, 1980). See the jurisprudence on Art. I
of the European Convention on Human Rights: Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), 1996VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2232 (Dec. 18, 1996); Chysostomos v. Turkey;
Papachrysostomou v. Turkey, Apps. Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89, 86-A Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 4, paras. 96-99 (1993); Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No.
15318/89 (Preliminary Objections), 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 99, para. 62 (1994);
Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007/77, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85,
paras. 18-26 (1978); Cyprus v. Turkey, Apps. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125, paras. 8-10 (1975).
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brief boundary skirmish between Peru and Ecuador in early 1995,

both states mustered considerable forces in the very confined area
of the clash,1 8 8 but the actual conflict did not exceed a few days,

and it resulted in limited casualties. 189 The Ecuadorian president
spoke of "war,"190 but no state is reported to have declared

neutrality or to have observed the duties of neutrals. The same is
true of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict, a localized and brief
conflict featuring nonetheless the employment of important
contingents of forces and intense fighting, which conflict did not
in the opinion of third states call for the application of
neutrality. 19 1 In the Falklands conflict, however, which was very
localized and involved the employment of limited force, some
directly concerned states declared that they would remain
92
neutral. 1

It follows that if a certain consistency is to be ascertained
from the various responses of the international community, one
must look to the characteristics of each conflict as a whole, and to
its potential repercussions. One thing that is already clear is that
distinctions between "total," "regional," "limited," or other types of
war 19 3 are irrelevant to neutrality as a matter of law, except to the
extent that they may explain or indicate the different positions of
More
various states as a matter of international relations.
importantly, it seems justified to state that third states may make
their own assessment of whether the conflict necessitates the
application of the law of neutrality. Indisputable as it is that the
determination of a state of war by the warring parties would be
conclusive interpartes,194 state practice demonstrates that such a
determination is not binding on third states, who may wish to
adopt their own position with regard to a given conflict. Scholars
who retain the concept of "material state of war" as relevant for

neutrality express this idea in similar terms. 195 It should not be

188.
See James Brooke, Ecuador and Peru again Skirmish over an old
disputed Border, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at A6; James Brooke, Ecuador downs
PeruvianHelicopterin BorderClash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at A6..
189. Peru, Ecuador Clash, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Feb. 4, 1995, available in
1995 WL 14357174; Julio Cesar Villaverde, Ecuador,Peru, Exchange treaty ending
conflict, Reuters World Serv., Feb. 17, 1995; available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS File; James Brooke, On Peru Border Strife is a yearly Event, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1995, atA3.
190. EcuadorAsks for U.S. Intervention, UPI, Feb. 24, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
191.
See supraPart III.B.
192.
See supra Part III.D.
193.
See RAYMOND ARON, PAix ET GUERRE ENTRE LES NATIONS 157 (8th ed.,
1984).
194.
See BROWNLIE, supranote 3, at 396.
See, e.g., Robert W. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea, XLX
195.
INT'L L. ST. 200 (1955); Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretationof War under Present
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thought, however, that the requirements for the application of
neutrality should be reduced to a determination by the
international community that neutrality should apply. 196

Such

circular reasoning renders the law devoid of any normativeness
and predictability, and must therefore not be upheld.
Again, the Falklands conflict is particularly instructive. The
states that considered that the application of neutrality necessary
for their interests made their determination of the severity of the
conflict independently and irrespective of the determinations
made by the belligerents; in fact, the belligerents did not consider
it necessary to bring about a formal state of war. There is thus
an element of relativity or functionality in the application of
neutrality. This observation or note of caution does not, as will be
demonstrated further, in principle deprive the position advanced
here of its merits. For the purposes of neutrality, the relevant
inquiry is a factual one, the assessment of which does not
exclusively belong to the belligerent parties. For such a concept,
similar to that of armed conflict, allows relatively limited leeway
for abuse of the law. It is on this basis that, for instance, the
censorship of Egypt's prize action by the Security Council must be
understood.
C. The Relevance of the Intentions of the Belligerents
For authors who take the position that a state of war is
brought about only if one of the parties has that intention, 197 the
application of the whole corpus of the Laws of War, and

consequently of the law of neutrality, depends upon the
intentions of the belligerents. Moreover, there are authors who
concur in the result, adopting the view that a declaration of war
or an assertion of belligerency is conclusive for the application of
neutrality. 19 8 At the outset, it should be recalled that state
practice, where a declaration of war is a rarity, suggests clearly
that neither the existence nor the absence of a declaration is
conclusive. As a principle, its existence is beside the point: if

InternationalLaw, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11 (1951). Cf. Research in International Law of the
Harvard Law School, Comment on the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of
Neutral States in Naval and A&ial Warfare, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 209, 211
(1939).
See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL
196.
LAW OFWAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 113 (1994).
See, e.g., Arnold McNair, The Meaning of War, and the Relation of War
197.
to Reprisals, 11 T.G.S. 29 (1926); MCNAIR & WATTS, supranote 101, at 2; CHARLES
ROUSSEAU, LE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMts 7, 371 (1983); Werner Meng, War, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 282, 282-90 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,

1982).
198.

See supranotes 63 & 141.
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hostilities of a certain magnitude take place, the existence of a
declaration or an assertion of war is neither detrimental nor
advantageous in the context of neutrality. This is not to suggest,
however, that the intentions of the belligerents are devoid of any
value.
1. The Contexts in which the Intentions of the Belligerents
Become Relevant
There are two issues to be discussed. The Falklands conflict
exemplifies the first: it is the only case in which third parties
declared neutrality before the commencement of fighting, while
the U.K. expeditionary force was on its way to the islands. The
third states' attitude illustrates that neutrality may be proclaimed
at the stage of "preparatory acts" (Vorbereitseinhandlung), with a
Evidently, the
view to an armed conflict that is imminent.

declarant states evaluated the situation taking into account the
intentions of the parties, as manifested by physical acts and
statements.
Nevertheless, it must not be thought that an
unequivocal manifestation of intentions to proceed to military
operations on a large scale is an independent and sufficient
condition for the application of the law of neutrality. Although it
will suffice for the adoption of a neutral position, the maintenance
of this position depends upon the definitive action upon these
intentions. Further, in the context of a clash that is already in
progress, military necessity dictates that constancy in fighting is
an unrealistic requirement for the definition of a state of
In this context also, the various
generalized hostilities.
statements and acts of the belligerents may be taken into account
as evidence of the intentions of the belligerents in order to predict
the course the conflict will take in the future.
The second issue is related to an academic view that
Professor Verdross was a major proponent of-that a declaration
of war is the only sufficient requirement for the law of neutrality
to apply, on the grounds that the status of neutral imposes
serious limitations on state sovereignty and should therefore not
be an option unless the situation is grave enough.19 9 His premise
was apparently that a declaration of war is a sign of "earnestness"
on the part of the declarant that warrants the application of the
law of neutrality. This point fails to fully account for the relevant
state practice. First, it is difficult to see why considerations of
"earnestness" or certainty should be decisive or even pertinent if
neutrality, as has been demonstrated, is an optional status.

199.
See ALFRED VERDROSS, DIE IMMERWAHRENDE NEUTRALITAT
50-53 (1978) (citing Bindschedler, supranote 63).

)STERREICHS
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Second, it is worthwhile recalling, in addition to the Pakistani
declaration of war (which was in all probability intended solely to
legitimize its exercise of prize jurisdiction),200 the two SinoJapanese wars of the 1930s. In these conflicts both belligerents
formally refrained from classifying their long and onerous
conflicts as wars to avoid the application of rules of international
law detrimental to their war aims, particularly sanctions by the
sought to avoid the
League of Nations. China in particular
20 1
application of the U.S. Neutrality Laws.
Although one may be tempted to explain away these extreme
cases as patent abuses or evasions of law, which would save the
theory, it should be remembered that it is practically difficult to
establish the fact of abuse or evasion. A margin of appreciation
will have to be conceded to a state manifesting its intentions in
matters of war,2 °2 if only because a state is presumed to act

lawfully. 203 The greater difficulty arises perhaps from the fact
that an abuse of rights is convincingly pronounced by a
disinterested body, like a court of law, whereas the Security
Council, if seized of such a matter, does not always qualify as
such. Egypt, for example, maintained the legality of her prize
action despite the fact that the Security Council unequivocally
refuted the pertinence of Egypt's arguments that a state of war
existed.
Certainly, Egypt would not disregard a court's
pronouncement to the same effect as readily. The problem is,
however, that the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals do not often preside over cases of that
sort, 2 ° 4 and then only ex postfacto.

One may object to the above on the grounds that if the
determination of the parties is conclusive, the failure to apply the

200.
201.

See supranotes 88-90 and accompanying text.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 387-389; CHARLEs G. FENWICK,

INTERNATIONAL LAW 643-44 (4th ed., 1965).

For a contemporaneous source, see

the discussions in LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 177, at 22 (1937).
202. Compare the relevant case-law of the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. See Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R., at 1 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 4(1976); see also the
ruling of the European Court of Justice on Article 225 of the European Economic
Community Treaty in Case C-120/94 R, Commission v. Hellenic Republic (Order),

1994 E.C.R. 1-3037; Opinion of Jacobs A.G. [published separately], June 6, 1994,
paras. 50 et seq.
203. Compare the dictum of the International Court of Justice in the Rights
of Passage over the Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (Nov.
26) (Preliminary Objections): "a text emanating from a Government must, in

principle, be interpreted as producing, and as intended to produce effects in
accordance with existing law and not in violation of it."
204. See J.G. Merrills, The Optional Clause Revisited, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L.1977, 232-34 (1993).
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law of neutrality should not pose a practical problem. One could
argue that a state may still adopt the measures it would have
adopted had it been formally neutral in the context of the law of
peace. The results, however, are unsatisfactory. The duties of
neutrality are complemented by guarantees of inviolability of the
neutral state, 20 5 and such assurances cannot be obtained in
general international law except by way of neutrality.
This
concept is particularly exemplified by the Falklands conflict.
Moreover, unless neutrality applies, the state concerned would
have no lawful alternative but to honor outstanding contracts
with the belligerents.
Therefore, the argument that a declaration of war or an
assertion of belligerency is always decisive does not hold true.
The value of a declaration of war when followed by actual fighting,
is that it is conducive to legal certainty, as it allows a
predetermination of the magnitude of the conflict. Moreover, a
declaration may be evaluated in the context of an objective
determination as an element in the consideration of the

magnitude of an existing conflict.
2. Irrelevance of a Declaration of War?
A possible argument against the position outlined above
would be based on the view that a state of war brought about by
such means is in principle illegal in itself.20 6 For purposes of this
analysis, the most relevant argument is that, since the use of
force is prohibited except in self defense, the aggressor state
would, by declaring war, confer upon itself new (belligerent)
rights. As a result, the law would allow a state to profit from its
own wrongdoing--ex iniurianon oriturius.
Admittedly, the construction has the advantage of logical and
systemic consistency in that it attempts to fit neutrality and war
into a broader picture of international law. It does, however,

205.
See Hague Convention V, supranote 12, arts. 1-3.
206.
See Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the 'State of War' 62
ASIL PROC. 58 (1968); NATHAN FEINBERG, THE LEGALITY OF A 'STATE OF WAR' AFTER

THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (1961), reprintedin STUDIES ININTERNATIONAL LAW, at
74 (1979); Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L
L. 365 (1953). This doctrinal opinion is reflected in, or followed by, the ruling of
an Israel Court. See Jiday v. Chief Executive Officer of Haifa, 22 I.L.R. 698 (S. Ct.
Isr. 1955). But see Richard R. Baxter, The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful
Use of Force under the Charter,62 ASIL PROC. 68 (1968); JULIUS STONE, OF LAW
AND NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND HUMAN HOPES (1974). Professor Scelle

takes a most interesting, but wider, view on the matter. Georges Scelle, Quelques
Rdflexions sur l'Abolition de la Competence de Guerre, 58 R.G.D.I.P. 5 (1954).
Contra JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION (1958).
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invite some observations. The thesis of this Article is that for the
purposes of neutrality war is essentially a fact,20 7 whereas the
proponents of the theory that a declaration of war is irrelevant
limit their objections to a state of war brought about by a
declaration or assertion of belligerency by the aggressor. 20
The
conflict is therefore limited to the case where a state of
generalized hostilities would come into being anyway-the
aggressor declaring war prior to or after the state of generalized
hostilities comes into being. With regard to that case, it will be
observed with respect, that this theory overlooks the difference
between material illegality and opposability.
Although logic
dictates that there will necessarily be at least one aggressor party
acting unlawfully, the unlawfulness is not opposable by the party
choosing to remain neutral. Neutrality by definition implies that

the right to pass judgment on legality is eschewed. In this sense,
the party, which (ex hypothesi validly under the U.N. Charter)
chooses to remain neutral, acquiesces in the illegality of the
aggressor. Conversely, if a third party refuses to submit to prize
action by one belligerent on the ground that such action is the
unlawful fruit of aggression, this would be a perfectly lawful
position, but not a position of neutrality.
Thus, it may be concluded that the intentions of the parties,
in whatever form they are expressed, are not binding as such on
third parties for the purposes of the law of neutrality.
A
declaration of war will therefore not oblige third parties to observe
neutrality. 20 9
Furthermore, and despite the dispositive or
optional character of neutrality, 2 10 a state may not lawfully
211
choose to observe neutrality in a "hostilities-free war."

V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has addressed the question of the meaning of war
in the particular context of neutrality, and has attempted to
provide a sober analysis of the law pertaining to the application of
the law of neutrality. The analysis of state practice has led to the
conclusion that the state of affairs decisive for neutrality consists
in actual fighting of a certain intensity and magnitude between

207.

Cf. the Turkish Indemnity case (Russia v. Turkey), 20 R.G.D.I.P. 19,

21 (1913) (Perm. Ct. Arb'n) ("[L]a guerre,fait internationalau premierchef .... ").
208. A declaration of war by the party acting in self-defense is arguably

permissible, or at least not detrimental to the innocence of that party.
209. See supraParts III.A.2 & III.B.
210. Cf. SCHWARZENBERGER, supranote 1, at 70.
211.
Contra JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMIcS OF DISPUTES AND WAR LAW 313 (1959).
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forces of (at least) two state entities-whereupon third states may
lawfully adopt a neutral position, even if the belligerents clearly
indicate that they do not consider themselves to be in a state of
war. Conversely, no formal assertion of belligerency is requested
of a belligerent party involved in such a situation for the exercise
of belligerent rights against third parties. These findings were
then systematically exposed in light of the concepts of "armed
conflict" and "state of war." It has been argued that, whereas the
former concept is insufficient by itself, the latter, although
perhaps not altogether in desuetude in state practice, 2 12 is
irrelevant.
The doctrinal approach in this Article consisted in adopting
the factual concept of a "state of generalized hostilities," which
best corresponds to what is believed to be the correct
interpretation of state practice.
It should not, however, be
thought that this concept is entirely original. As has been stated,
it is based on the concept of armed conflict, and has more than
certain affinities to the concept of the state of war in the
"material" or "objective" sense. The employment of a different and

specific notion is prompted not by some undue eclecticism of the
Author, but by the fact that this Article cannot make a wider
claim to settle all issues related to the state of war, as the
unreserved adoption of a certain conception of the principles of
state of war and armed conflict would imply. Moreover, it is
founded on the wider premise that the generic notion of "war"
may acquire different meanings so as to accommodate the specific
purposes of the law applicable in a given case. 2 13 As so often in
law generally, the answer to the question of the meaning of
something depends on why the question is asked in the first
place.
For instance, the rich case law of national courts
demonstrates that the existence of a state of war may be relevant
or irrelevant to the construction of a given agreement 2 14 or

212. See Greenwood, supranote 150.
213. See STONE, supra note 211 at 312; FRITZ GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR
AND PEACE 198-224 (1949); L.C. Green, Armed Conflict, War, and Self-Defence, 6
A.V.R. 387 (1956-57); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ARMED CONFLICT 190 (1992)

214. From the various national cases a representative mix is as follows.
Cases dealing with the interpretation of contractual terms in commercial
contracts: ]poux Bordier v. Epoux Lorilleux, 40 I.L.R. 434 (Cass. Civ. 1960) (Fr.);
In re Grotrian, [1955] 1 Ch. 501; Arab Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank (Dominion,
Colonial and Overseas), [1954] 2 All E.R. 226 (H.L.), affirming [1953] 2 All E.R.
263 (C.A.); Ruffy-Arnell and Baumann Aviation Co., Ltd. v. The King, [1922] 1
K.B. 599; Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. et al.; [1918] 1 App. Cas. 260;
Fibrosa Spolka Akcjna v. Fairbaim Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] 1 App.
Cas. 32 (Eng.).
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2 15

It is further believed that the introduction of the concept of
the state of generalized hostilities accommodates the interests of
An important question is
all concerned parties to a conflict.
whether the belligerents or third parties should enjoy exclusivity

Cases dealing with the interpretation of contractual terms ("war risks") in
insurance contracts: Western Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Meadows, 256 S.W.2d
674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Jackson v. North America Insurance Society of
Virginia, 183 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1971); Borysoglebski v. Continental Insurance Co.,
14 I.L.M. 78 (N.D. M. 1974); Shneiderman v. Metropolitan Casualty Co. of New
York, 220 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 44
N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1942); Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 131 A.2d 600 (Pa.
1957); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 25 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 1943); Pan
American World Airways Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d
Cir. 1974); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948);
Marissal v. Mutuelle G6n6rale Frangaise Accidents, 1950 D. Jur. 577 (Cass. Civ.);
La Paternelle-Vie v. Mellec, 1951 D. Jur., Somm. 21 (Cass. Civ.); The Kervel, 48
I.L.R. 469 (Trib. Comm. Nautes 1966) (Fr.); Papadimitriou v. Henderson, (1989]
All E.R. 908 (K.B.); Union Castle Mail Steamship Co. Ltd. v. U.K. Mutual War
Risks Assoc. Ltd., [1958] 1 All E.R. 431 (Q.B.); Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Gibbon,
[1953] 2 All E.R. 1086 (C.A.); Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd. v. Janson,
[1900] 2 Q.B. 339 (Eng.).
Cases dealing with the interpretation of charter-parties: Kawasaki Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co., Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 544
(C.A.), affirming [1938] 3 All E.R. 80 (K.B.); Spanish Government v. North of
England Steamship Co., Ltd., 54 T.L.R. 852 (1938) (K.B.); Andrea Esposito v.
Samuel Wilson Bowden, 119 E.R. 1430 (1911) (C.A.); Geipel v. Smith, 7 Q.B. 404
(1872) (Eng.); Navios Corporation v. The Ulysses II, 161 F. Supp 932, affd 260
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1958).
215. Cases dealing with the interpretation of rules of military discipline:
Robb v. U.S., 456 F.2d 768 (Ct. C1. 1972); Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816 (9th
Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Bancroft, 20 I.L.R. 586 (1953); Military Prosecutor v. Bakir, 48
I.L.R. 478 (Military Ct. Ramallah 1970) (Isr.); In re Zabita, 5 Ann. Dig. 491 (192930) (S. Ct. Lith. 1929).
Cases on the interpretation of Criminal Statutes: U.S. v. Sobbel, 314 F.2d 314
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 857 (1963); War in Korea Case, 20 I.L.R. 591
(Ct. App. Paris 1953) (Fr.).
Cases dealing with Emergency Legislation: Marcus Clark & Co. Ltd. v. The
Commonwealth, 20 I.L.R. 594 (H.C. Austl. 1952); Australian Communist Party v.
The Commonwealth, 20 I.L.R. 592 (H.C. Austl. 1951); Re Guyot, 48 I.L.R. 467
(Conseil d'Etat 1966) (Fr.).
Cases interpreting Enemy Legislation: In re Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F.
Supp 648 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Rex v. Bottrill, [1947] K.B. 41; Schering, Ltd. v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank Aktiebolag [1946] 1 All E.R. 36 (H.L.).
See also Conseil d'Etat, Judgment of Dec. 16, 1953, Dame Veuve Nguyen Ba
Chinh et autres, Lebon 553 (administrative liability).
Cases where the determination of the legal situation by the Government is
conclusive and binding on the judiciary include: Mansur Ali v. Arodhendu
Shekhar Chattaijee, 71 I.L.R. 708 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (Pak.); Jubran v. U.S., 255 F.2d
81 (5th Cir. 1958); U.S. v. Bussoz, 218 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1955); The Eastern
Carrying Ins. Co. v. The National Benefit Life and Property Assurance Co. (Ltd.),
35 T.L.R. 292 (1919) (K.B.); Silberwacht v. Attorney-General, 20 I.L.R. 153 (Dist.
Ct. Tel-Aviv 1953). See generally A.B. Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the Foreign
Office Certificate, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 240 (1946).
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in the assessment of the state of affairs-in other words, whether
the legal determination of the situation by the former or the latter
should be conclusive and binding on the other. This Article
suggests, in accordance with state practice and consistently with
the premises already stated, that neither enjoys exclusivity. In so
far as the belligerents are concerned, the purpose of the corpus of
the Laws of War is invariably to impose limits on their conduct,
and it would be repugnant to legal logic to render the obligations
of third states dependent solely on the conduct of the parties
whose actions the law seeks to regulate.
Nevertheless, if a detournement of the law may be effected by
both the warring and third parties, the leeway of both must be
limited to the extent possible. The introduction of the factual
concept of a state of generalized hostilities is appropriate to that
end. For such a state of affairs, based on the concept of armed
conflict, is more readily ascertainable and leaves less room for
ambiguity. It is conducive to legal security and promotes a sense
of objectivity in the law, which are aims to be advanced by legal
2 16
norms.

216. Cf. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania 1950 I.C.J. 65, 74; Asylum (Col. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274-75; The
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 132; Nottebohm (Liecht.
v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 21-23.

